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ABSTRACT
The decision to take more education is complex, and is influenced by individual
ability, financial constraints, family background, preferences, etc. Such factors,
normally unobserved by the researcher, introduce endogeneity and heterogeneity
problems into estimating the returns to education. In this paper, these problems
are addressed by estimating a comparative advantage model for schooling, in
which the returns to education vary at diﬀerent levels of education. The model
requires that instruments must be specified at each level of education, and we
suggest that diﬀerent school reforms in Norway can serve as suitable instruments.
In particular, we exploit the staged implementation of a major reform in the
comprehensive school system in the 1960s. We find that the returns to education
are strongly nonlinear. In particular, we find that the returns to upper secondary
school and shorter programs at regional colleges, together with master’s programs
at universities, have high returns as measured by wages. Also, we find that the
average treatment eﬀect is surprisingly high for medium-length educations (up
to two years of college education). This means that increasing the general level
of education, which was the intention of the comprehensive school reform of the
1960s and of other school reforms, has the potential to generate a high return in
wages, although we do not consider the cost to society. We also find that there
is a substantial diﬀerence between the average treatment eﬀect and the eﬀect of
treatment on the treated for bachelor’s and master’s degrees at universities.
JEL Classification: C3, I2
Key word: Eduation reforms, returns to education
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1 Introduction
There is much controversy regarding the measurement of returns to education,
especially because of selection problems and heterogeneity in returns; see, for in-
stance, recent contributions by Card (1999, 2001), Carneiro and Heckman (2002),
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) and Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2002).
The main problem in measuring returns to education is that the decision to take
more education is a complex process. Factors such as individual ability, financial
constraints, family background and preferences are usually unobserved by the
researcher. This creates an endogeneity problem inherent in most evaluation and
labor market studies; see Griliches (1976), Heckman (1974, 1976) and Gronau
(1974). An additional problem relates to observed and unobserved heterogeneity
in the return parameters of education and the interpretation of diﬀerent return
parameters; see Lang (1991), Willis and Rosen (1979), Card (1995, 1999) and
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999). This heterogeneity arises if individuals select their
education on the basis of their comparative advantages; see Roy (1951), Garen
(1987) and Willis and Rosen (1979).
Estimating a comparative advantage model for schooling with many educa-
tional levels (the generalized Roy model)1, in which returns vary between individ-
uals at each level of education, requires instruments to be specified for each level
of education in order to identify the return parameters, unless very restrictive
functional form assumptions are imposed. Our main contribution to this litera-
ture is to exploit features of diﬀerent school reforms in Norway to estimate a Roy
model for returns to education in which several levels of education are specified.
The main reform we use in our identification strategy is the school reform
extending mandatory years of schooling from seven to nine years. This reform
took more than ten years to implement. For those years, we observe the same
birth cohorts going through both types of compulsory school system. In addition,
we use sequential education reforms in Norway at the upper secondary, college
1This approach follows Willis and Rosen (1979), Garen (1987), Bjørklund and Moﬃtt (1987)
and Heckman and Vytlacil (1999). Papers estimating the returns to education using this
approach usually specify the Roy model for only two levels of education (noncollege and college
degrees). For models of this kind using discrete outcome variables, see Aakvik et al. (2000,
2003).
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and university education levels. The identification strategy uses a diﬀerence in
diﬀerences approach for identification, as in Duflo (2001), to identify the return
to each schooling level. We use as instruments the reform of compulsory school-
ing and additional information on whether schools were providing the six levels
above basic schooling in the municipality, and allow for interactions between the
availability of schools at diﬀerent levels and the compulsory school reform.
As well as using detailed data on educational reforms, we exploit an extremely
rich database for Norway consisting of very detailed register information on the
human capital characteristics of the individuals for the 1948 to 1957 cohorts that
were exposed to the reforms. We also have detailed background information
on their parents including their education, income, the number of children in the
family, and the municipality in which they grew up. These data are from the 1960
and 1970 Censuses. A feature of the data on employer-employee relationships is
exploited when calculating tenure. The net sample comprises 160,000 individuals
born from 1948 to 1957.
We assess the eﬀect of the reform on increasing participation rates in higher
education in general. Furthermore, we test whether the increased education due
to the reforms led to higher returns to education. Family background, especially
fathers’ and mothers’ education, is a very important determinant of participation
in higher education. We also find that this eﬀect was weaker after the mandatory
school reform was introduced. When estimating returns to education, we find
that the returns to education are highly nonlinear and that the Roy model is
better than a traditional model in which schooling is a continuous variable. In
particular, we find that the returns to upper secondary school and up to two years
of education at regional colleges, together with master’s programs at universities,
have a high return as measured by wages. Also, we find that the average treat-
ment eﬀect is surprisingly high for medium-length education (up to two years of,
usually regional, college education). This means that increasing the general level
of education, which was the intention of the comprehensive school reform of the
1960s and other school reforms, has the potential to generate a high return in
wages, although we do not consider the cost issue for society. We also find that
there is a substantial diﬀerence between the average treatment eﬀect and the
eﬀect of treatment on the treated for bachelor’s and master’s degrees. Whereas
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the diﬀerence between the average treatment eﬀect and the eﬀect of treatment on
the treated is only a few percentage points for educational levels up to bachelor’s
degree level, the diﬀerence in the average treatment eﬀect and the eﬀect of treat-
ment on the treated is more than 12 percentage points per year for bachelor’s
and master’s degrees.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data
sets and defines variables used in the analysis. Section 3 provides background
information on the school reforms in Norway. Special attention is paid to our
identification strategy and the robustness of the instruments. Section 4 presents
our econometric framework for estimating the returns to education. Section 5
reports the determinants of school choice from the regression analysis. In ad-
dition, we report results from earnings regressions and diﬀerent policy relevant
parameters, such as the average treatment eﬀect and the eﬀect of treatment on
the treated, from a model that allows for selection into educational levels on the
basis of comparative advantage. The final section presents our conclusions.
2 Data Set and Variables
The main data sources for our study are administrative registers from Statistics
Norway. Each individual is characterized by his or her personal identity code
and information from diﬀerent administrative registers is merged for each person
in the population. The data set covers persons working in all sectors - private
manufacturing, private services, and the public sector - in 1995, for the birth
cohorts of 1948 to 1957. For the wage regressions, we use information on expe-
rience, seniority, years of education, type of education, annual income, and the
employment relationship. We can calculate seniority and quantify the employ-
ment relationships because we have a merged employer-employee data set.
In addition to the information on education for each person, we use infor-
mation on family background for the period in which the person grew up and
started compulsory education. This includes parents’ or guardian’s income, their
education and municipality and county. This information is from the National
Censuses of Population and Housing in 1960 and 1970; see Vassenden (1987).
We use both the type and number of years of education received in the empir-
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ical analysis.Years of education is based on the normal duration of the education.
It includes only completed (and highest attained) education, and all formal educa-
tion courses exceeding 300 hours are registered. This variable has 14 values (from
seven to 20 years of education). Type of education is based on characteristics of
the Norwegian education system and Statistics Norway’s standard classification
of education. We group our sample into the seven levels presented in Table I.
Table I (Definition of education levels applied in the analysis)
This method of defining the education categories in Norway is very common
and is used in the Norwegian educational statistics. It reflects the school sys-
tem and includes vocational schools, upper secondary schools, up to two years
of education in regional colleges, university degrees of three to four years, and
degrees of five years or more. This classification fits nicely with the Roy model
for education, assuming that individuals have comparative advantages at certain
educational levels and act on these when choosing education. One would expect
that students primarily think in terms of types of education - for instance of
becoming a history teacher - and then perhaps consider years of education for
instance, of becoming a history teacher in the primary school system requiring
an undergraduate university degree or of teaching in high school with a graduate
level degree. A model that specifies the type of education is expected to clarify
results of student choices based on comparative advantages. Although we have
seven diﬀerent levels of education, we only have five diﬀerent types of school. The
two vocational levels correspond to the same type of school. In addition, the two
upper educational levels correspond to university degrees (bachelor’s and mas-
ter’s degrees or higher). Another reason to define education categories instead
of using years of education when assessing the eﬀect of educational reforms, is
that most educational reforms have non-linear eﬀects on educational attainment
measured as years of education. Hence, it is preferred to specify types of educa-
tion for comparison between the old and the new education system since a scalar
measure defined in years of education will not capture the changes.
Annual earnings in 1995 were calculated from annual taxable income as re-
ported in the tax register. Tenure is defined as the number of years spent working
for the current employer. Work experience is based on the number of years in
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which annual earnings exceed the basic minimum level of the old-age pension.
In 1995, this amounted to NOK 40,000 (around USD 5000). This is our best
approximation of the number of years spent in the labor market; see Bratberg
and Vaage (2000).
To measure labor market outcomes, we use annual earnings. Furthermore,
we restrict our sample to full time workers, defined as those working more than
30 hours a week, since annual earnings is used as the outcome variable. Workers
holding multiple jobs, self-employed workers and workers participating in labor
market programs or receiving unemployment benefits were all excluded from the
sample.
For family income, we sum the father’s and mother’s income in 1970, collected
from the Census data. We divide family income into groups based on percentiles.
The father’s and mother’s education is represented by a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether or not they have a college education. The data selection process is
illustrated in Table II.
Table II (Data selection process)
The ten diﬀerent male cohorts born between 1948 and 1957 amount to 295,646
individuals. Data on parents is missing for more than 20 percent of the individ-
uals in the sample. Data on parents are important for two reasons. First, they
are used to determine where individuals grew up and in which municipality they
went to school. This is important information because it is used to construct our
instruments (the availability of diﬀerent types of school). Second, family back-
ground variables, such as parental education and income, are important factors
in modeling the level of education. We have removed from the sample individuals
with missing parental information from the Census data from 1960 or 1970.
When looking at the returns to education, we only use full time working
persons. We exclude persons in this age cohort who have no work or are working
part-time, or have missing data on tenure. This amounts to about 20 percent of
the sample. Descriptive statistics for the net sample are provided in Table III.
Table III (Descriptive statistics for the net sample of 159,452 individuals)
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The age in 1995 for persons in our sample varies from 38 to 47 years. Mean
work experience is 21 years with a standard deviation of 4, and mean tenure is
7.5 years with a standard deviation of almost 6. Mean years of education is 12.1.
Around 10 percent of the sample has a father with a college degree. This is not
surprising since the level of education for persons with children born in the 1950s
is low. Only 3 percent of the sample has a mother with a college degree. The
availability of diﬀerent types of school is an important determinant of educational
choice. Eighty percent of those in our sample lived in a municipality that oﬀered
vocational training and education. Sixtyeight percent of the sample lived in a
municipality that had upper secondary school. Fortytwo percent had a regional
college in the municipality in which they grew up. About 20 percent could go to
a university in their home municipality. The universities in Norway are located
in Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, and Tromsø.
3 Education in Norway
From the 1960s to the 1990s, the Norwegian education system went through sev-
eral major reforms. The starting point was reforming compulsory primary and
junior secondary schools, which happened primarily in the 1960s, and extending
the minimum mandatory education period from seven to nine years. During a
ten year period, two distinct school systems co-existed: there were municipali-
ties with nine years of mandatory schooling and others with only seven years of
compulsory schooling. The potential eﬀects are expected to be larger and thus
easier to measure in the case of Norway than in most other countries, because the
Norwegian reform went further both in unifying the comprehensive school system
and in promoting equality of opportunity; see Leschinsky and Mayer (1990).
The reform process then continued to (voluntary) upper secondary schools
(“gymnas”) in the mid 1970s. At almost the same time, it reached the post
upper secondary/college level, where the reform process lasted until the present
college structure was launched in the early 1990s. These reforms are used in
this paper as part of the identification strategy for estimating the returns to
education. The reform of the mandatory schooling period was probably the most
influential, and is closest to being a natural experiment. Hence, it constitutes the
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main element in our identification strategy. We provide information on the aims
of the reform, procedures for implementing it and how it was financed, etc.
3.1 The Mandatory School Reform
The mandatory school reform, enacted by the Norwegian Parliament in 1959,
was started in 1960, and lasted until 1972.2 The reform extended the number of
compulsory years of schooling and unified the education system at the tertiary
level.3 In the Norwegian pre-reform system, children started school at the age
of seven and finished their compulsory education after seven years, i.e., at the
age of 14. The old system had a parallel system of voluntary lower secondary
education, comprising two years of junior high school (“realskole”) in preparation
for upper secondary school, followed by university education, and the so-called
continuation school (“framhaldsskole”) which prepared students for vocational
training and general training outside the systems of higher professional training
and theoretical education. Selection into junior high school was based on grades,
and it was available in some municipalities but not in others. In the new system,
the starting age remained at seven years, but the time spent in compulsory edu-
cation increased to nine years. The nine years were divided into two levels: first,
six years of primary school; and second, three years of secondary school, which
prepared students for high school.4
The aims of the reform were stated explicitly in several governmental back-
2See Lov om folkeskolen av 1959 (Law on primary schooling). The reform had already
started on a small and explorative basis in the late 1950s, but applied to a negligible number of
students because only three municipalities, each with a small number of schools, were involved.
See Lie (1974), Telhaug (1969), and Lindbekk (1992), for descriptions of the reform.
3Similar school reforms were undertaken in most other European countries in the same
period, notably Sweden, the United Kingdom and, to some extent, France and Germany. Meghir
and Palme (2003) present results using Swedish data, and Blundell et al. (1997) do so using
U.K. data.
4The Norwegian school system has been slightly changed recently by the so-called “Re-
form97”. Children now start at the age of six and the time spent in compulsory education
is ten years, of which seven are at primary school and three are at secondary school. In ad-
dition, three years are available to all students either preparing for university or for a trade
(vocational).
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ground papers. These were: 1) to increase the minimum level of education in
society by extending the number of compulsory years of education from seven to
nine; 2) to smooth the transition to higher education by unifying the education
system up to secondary education; and 3) to increase equality of opportunity
along socio-economic and, in particular, geographic lines both by providing re-
sources to establish the new comprehensive schools in all municipalities and by
securing a common curriculum for all schools.
The reform period lasted from 1960 to 1972, when a new law for mandatory
schooling was passed, stating that all municipalities should have introduced the
nine-year mandatory school system by 1973. Hence, for more than a decade,
the Norwegian compulsory school system was divided into two. The first cohort
that was aﬀected by the reform was the one born in 1947. This cohort started
school in 1954, and (i) either finished the pre-reform compulsory school period
in 1961, or (ii) went to primary school from 1954 to 1960, then entered the post-
reform secondary school system from 1960 to 1962. The last cohort to which,
in principle, the old system could apply was born in 1959. This cohort started
school in 1965 and finished compulsory school in 1972.
3.1.1 Implementation of the reform
The law of 1959 for mandatory schooling established a central administration
agency (under the Ministry of Education), The Royal Council for Experimenta-
tion in the Schools (“Forsøksrådet for skoleverket”), to direct the implementation
of the reform. It was established to “experiment” by using innovations in schools.
The reform was oﬃcially regarded as an experiment in the 1960s until the new
law for primary schools was enacted in 1969; see Lie (1974). Although the agency
was in charge of the reform, it was the municipalities (which is the lowest level of
of local administration) that decided whether to implement the reform. The mu-
nicipalities had to apply to The Royal Council for Experimentation in the Schools
to implement the new school system for the whole municipality. In 1960, there
were 750 municipalities in Norway.5 In order to apply, the municipalities had to
5In the mid 1960s, the number of municipalities was reduced to about 450. Because we
use the municipalities existing in 1960 to identify the reform municipalites, this change has no
eﬀect for the identification strategy used in this paper.
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present a plan for the new school in terms of buildings, teachers, and funding.
The law of 1959 made it clear that the extra costs of teachers and buildings were
funded by the state.
It is diﬃcult to determine the criteria under which applicants were selected by
the committee. However, the committee wanted to include diﬀerent communities
to make the sample representative of the whole country and ensure that the plans
for buildings and so on were acceptable; Telhaug (1969), Mediås (2000). Another
important factor for adopting the reforms has been identified by Lie (1973, 1974).
The school director at the county level, who is an appointed representative of the
state, played a central role in co-ordinating the adoption process being undertaken
by the state and the municipality. So-called “dynamic” school directors played
an important role in getting the reforms adopted.6 This is also supported by the
finding of Lie (1974) that all municipalities within a county tended to implement
the reform at the same time.
In the public debate during 1950s and 1960s, it was claimed that the old ed-
ucational system with more streaming was a better preparation for high school
and university than the new system, indicating that richer and urban areas may
have been slow to implement the reform. It was also claimed in the public debate
that nine years of mandatory schooling was of less importance in many rural
communities, where, since fishing and farming were the main industries, seven
years of compulsory education was regarded as suﬃcient. In her contemporary
study of the reform, Lie (1973, 1974), tested diﬀerent hypotheses about the dif-
fusion of the reform. For instance, were the richest municipalities the first to
implement the reform? Were cities first? Alternatively, did poorer rural areas
implement the reform first because there were obvious economic incentives to do
so? Lie’s (1973, 1974) finding that neither average earnings, taxable income nor
educational levels had an impact on reform adoption is interesting. Her explana-
tion for this finding relates to the subsidies provided by the central government.
The main finding in her dissertation is that there appear to be neighbour ef-
fects in adoption. When one municipality adopts the reform, adoption spreads
6The important role of school directors has been reported in several conversations with
people who were school administrators during this period, and with researchers from other
fields.
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to neighboring municipalities. One explanation for this pattern might be the
co-ordinating role played by school directors at the county level. Other reforms
of communication or co-ordination between neighboring municipalities were also
used, including regular meetings between politicians in the same county. Another
explanation could be that neighboring municipalities share the same characteris-
tics such as income levels, education levels, and political preferences. This is true
to some extent because education levels and incomes are regionally dispersed.
However, regions in the far east, north, west and south of the country all have
low and high incomes and education levels, so that neighboring municipalities
include both rich and poor. In sum, Lie’s research supports a complex adoption
process without finding support for single important factor to explain the imple-
mentation process. In Section 3.2, we undertake a more formal evaluation of the
reform as an instrument in the earnings equations that we estimate.
3.1.2 Identification of pupils’ school reform status
Information on the type of school attended is not available at the individual level,
except for those who left school with the minimum level of educational attain-
ment (seven or nine years). In order to classify individuals and neighborhoods
according to a before/after-reform indicator, we identify the implementation year
at the municipality level. This indicator is constructed as follows. From the 1960
census population, we restrict our attention to those individuals for whom we can
clearly identify the type of compulsory schooling attained. For each cohort and
municipality, we count the number of people in each group. If there were no ge-
ographical mobility and the reform implemented in a clear-cut way, there would
be no overlap of observations. However, because some people move, and hence
attend school in other municipalities, and the reform was implemented gradually
in some places, we need to examine the relative numbers of graduates from the
old and the new systems.
Since the number of people who left school with only the mandatory level of
education is likely to be aﬀected by the reform, we cannot compare the number
of people with seven years of school with the number of people with nine years
of school as their final attainment. Therefore, we define two “intermediate”
measures of a switching cohort, from which the final indicator is constructed.
11
First, we calculate the average rate at which students leave with only seven years
in the 1946 to 1948 cohort7 in a given municipality. When the yearly fraction
of people who finish with seven years of school drops below this “benchmark”
by 50 percent, it is a possible indication that the reform has been implemented.
Similarly, we calculate the average rate at which students leave with only nine
years of school in the 1957 to 1959 cohort. When the yearly fraction of students
who leave with only nine years of school reaches 50 percent of this rate is another
indicative measure. The two switching indicators are then used to define the
year of implementation as follows. When the two coincide, this is our estimate
of reform implementation. If there is a gap between them of one or two years,
so that it seems that those with seven years of school finished before those with
nine years of school started, we use the indicator of nine years as our estimate.
For the case of a one-year overlap, so that it seems that those with nine years
of school started before those with seven years of school finished, we manually
checked all the larger municipalities (more than 100 students) against Ness (1971)
and local informants. For smaller municipalities with a one-year overlap between
the possible indicators, we have randomly assigned one of the candidates as our
estimate of the reform year. We have dropped from the sample the municipalities
for which our two indicators diverge by more than two years and those for which
manual assignment of the larger municipalities did not work. This procedure
provides a unique estimate of the year of implementation (transformed into a
birth cohort by subtracting 13 years) for 545 of the 728 municipalities.8 See
Raaum et al. (2003) for the relative importance of these rules as applied to the
data. Although there will certainly be some measurement error in our reform
date taken as a flow indicator of reforms, we expect that any measurement error
in the stock of reformed and nonreformed municipalities, for a given year, would
be small. The implementation profile is displayed in Figure I and illustrates the
gradual change in compulsory schooling in Norway for pupils and municipalities.
7For the identification of the reform year, we exploit information on all cohorts exposed to
the reform, even though we have restricted our samples to the 1948 to 1957 cohort in the rest
of the study.
8We also tested diﬀerent ways of defining reform indicators and restricting the sample,
including taking out problematic municipalities, taking out problematic cohorts, and using
simpler definitions of indicators. The results are robust to these variations.
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Figure I (Implementation of the reform)
3.1.3 High school, college and university reforms
The reform of upper secondary schools took place in the mid 1970s. At the
same time, the post upper secondary/college level was reorganized, in which
the reform process lasted until the present college structure was launched in
the early 1990s. All of these reforms will be used as part of the identification
strategy for estimating returns to education using the Roy model. The reform
of compulsory schooling is also used as a basis for the instrument in this model
in which we estimate returns to types of education, by allowing for interactions
between the availability of schools at higher education levels and the compulsory
school reform. Variation in the availability of diﬀerent upper secondary schools
and colleges/universities is partly explained by educational reforms that led to
an expansion in the number of schools. However, most of the variation is along
the cross-sectional dimension. Hence, these instruments are to be interpreted
primarily as the distance to education; see Card (1995).
We have constructed a database that assigns diﬀerent types of educational
institutions to the diﬀerent municipalities.9 Combined with our information on
the municipalities in which the individuals grew up, we are able to construct a
variable that indicates whether an individual had access to diﬀerent educational
levels in the same municipality. Table IV illustrates availability for the oldest,
the median, and the youngest cohort, represented by the fraction of individuals,
with access.
Table IV (Availability of diﬀerent schools. Individual data)
Table V illustrates availability for the oldest, the median, and the youngest
cohorts, represented by the fraction of municipalities.
Table V (Availability of diﬀerent schools in municipalities. N=435)
9For the period 1974 to 1992, Statistics Norway provides data in electronic format. For
earlier years, we have collected data from issues of Norwegian Educational Statistics (various
years). Years after 1992 were not regarded as relevant, since not even the youngest cohort in
question (1957) was considered to be in education.
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Both methods of calculating availability show an increase in the density of
all schools over time. Obviously, the largest eﬀect is for the compulsory schools,
which form the main part of our identification strategy. As for levels higher than
compulsory school, important reforms have taken place in the previous decades,
all of which (to some extent) were intended to make schools available in more
municipalities, or to more individuals. For example, between 1961 and 1970,
there was a six percent increase in the number of municipalities providing upper
secondary schools, which meant that this level of education was available (within
the municipalities) to 71 percent of the individuals in the 1957 cohort, compared
with 65 percent in the 1948 cohort. However, our data also allow us to exploit
the variation between municipalities. The fractions reported in Tables IV and V
reveal that this variation is even greater than the variation over time.
3.2 Evaluation of the Instruments
In this section, we discuss the validity of the instruments on the basis of two
standard criteria: (i) their impact on the variable(s) for which they serve as
instruments; and (ii) their independence of the error term.
3.2.1 Impact of comprehensive reform
Table VI reports the unconditional proportion of persons in diﬀerent qualification
groups by reform status, and the diﬀerence in educational attainment between
the two subsamples.
Table VI (Observed distribution of qualification levels by reform status)
Comparing pre- and post-reform samples, there is a distinct decrease (6.4 per-
centage points) in the proportion of individuals with compulsory education only.
For the remaining levels, educational attainment is higher for pre-reform than
post-reform individuals, particularly for lower educational levels. For example,
the proportion of people with upper secondary school is 4.4 percent for the pre-
reform sample, and 5.5 percent for the post-reform period, which is an increase
of more than 22 percent. The only exception is the highest level of education,
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where attainment is lower for the post-reform sample; however, the diﬀerence is
not significant.
Note, however, that the cohorts in question all experienced a major expansion
of the general education system. The numbers in Table VI are unconditional of
this trend. Because the reform was implemented sequentially from 1959 to 1973,
the fraction of individuals with post-reform compulsory education is higher in
younger cohorts. Furthermore, the 1960s was a period of major change in the
municipality structure, including changes in the localization of schools. Conse-
quently, cohorts and regions should be controlled for. Two other sources fre-
quently debated in the literature, see for instance Card (1999), are diﬀerences
in ability and diﬀerences in liquidity constraints. Unfortunately, direct infor-
mation on ability (exam scores , IQ-tests, etc.) is very limited in Norway, and
is not included in our data set. On the other hand, our data is rich in other
types of background information, such as family income and education, and has
information on the individuals’ parents.
To evaluate the reform’s impact on educational attainment conditional on
these arguments, we estimate an ordered probit model for levels of education. The
explanatory variables included in the schooling equation are cohort dummies (ten
cohorts), dummy variables for geographical location (19 counties), family income
in 1970 (quartiles) and the level of education for mothers and fathers (dummy
variables for college education).
The parameter estimates from the ordered probit model are presented and
discussed in Section 5.1. Here, we report predicted pre- and post-reform education
levels.
Table VII (Predicted distribution of qualification levels by reform status)
It is clear that the reform, taking account of the positive trend in educational
attainment, parents’ income, etc., had an impact, particularly at the lower levels
of higher education. We find counter-intuitive responses at the highest levels of
education, i.e., for the second highest and the highest levels of education (bach-
elor’s and master’s degrees). This indicates that the reform produced a (small)
fraction of “defiers”; i.e., individuals who would have attained the highest level
of education under the old system, but fail to do so under the new system. This
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result should be interpreted with care, however. Reform of comprehensive schools
is likely to be a poor predictor of the highest levels of education, and the reported
decrease in attainment might be coincidental rather than systematic.
Reform of compulsory schooling is used as the single instrument only in the
traditional earning-schooling equation, in which the schooling variable is treated
as a continuous variable. This model is discussed in Section 4.1. To take into
account possible nonlinearities as well as observed and unobserved heterogeneity,
we estimate a Roy model in which we use education as a discrete variable instead
of education as a continuous variable. The Roy model is discussed in Section
4.2. To identify the returns to education in this model, we need an instrument
for each level of education. We use variation in availability of diﬀerent post-
compulsory schools as part of our identification strategy. We use the availability
of these schools interacted with the reform of compulsory schooling dummy as
our instrument; see for instance Duflo (2001). We illustrate the idea behind
the use of this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy with a two-by-two table for each
type of school. The table shows the average number of years of education10 for
individuals in municipalities that introduced the mandatory school reform and
those that did not, and in municipalities in which all other types of schools were
available and in those in which they were not.
Table VIII.1-VIII.4 (Means of education by school availability)
The tables show that the average number of years of educational attainment
is higher in municipalities that introduced the reform that increased mandatory
education to nine years, but it also shows that the average length of education
increased more in municipalities that do not provide higher education. The diﬀer-
ence in these diﬀerences can be interpreted as the causal eﬀect of the educational
reforms, under the assumption that the mean years of education would have been
the same in areas with and without the higher educational institutions. On aver-
age, the eﬀect of the reform in terms of the increase in the duration of education
10We use years of education in these tables for convenience only. In our model, we use the
level of education, rather than years of education, but to present Table VIII using levels of
education would produce 28 diﬀerent tables, which we do not report here.
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is 0.79 years in municipalities without vocational schools, and 0.75 years for mu-
nicipalities that did oﬀer this form of education. The diﬀerence is 0.025 years for
municipalities with and without upper secondary schools, whereas it is distinctly
higher, almost 0.25 years, for the highest level of education (University II).11 The
eﬀect of the mandatory school reform is bigger in areas that had less availability
of higher education and it probably reflects the fact that the reform had stronger
eﬀects in regions where the enrollment into higher education was low.
3.2.2 Testing the instrument
We now turn to a formal treatment of the question raised in Section 3.1.1, namely,
whether it is possible to treat the reform as a natural experiment. If the im-
plementation of the reform was not random across municipalities, a principal
methodological problem occurs if we want to use the reform as an instrument. In
other words, it rests on the assumption that the comprehensive school reform was
introduced randomly and not systematically by, for instance, being introduced
first in rich municipalities. If it relied on local financing, more aﬄuent municipal-
ities could have aﬀorded to select themselves into the reform at an early stage.
Children in these municipalities would have been more likely to become better
educated and earn more as adults. Hence, we need to explore whether the reform
implementation is correlated with municipality characteristics that might have
(indirect) eﬀects on earnings.
In Table IX we regress the year of implementation against diﬀerent back-
ground variables based on municipality averages, such as parental income and
the level of education, age, size of the municipality, etc.
Table IX (Implementation of reform. Regression. Cohort 1948-1957)
It seems reasonable to conclude that there is no systematic pattern in the
introduction rate in relation to parental average earnings, education levels and
11This finding does not contradict the results in Tables VI and VII, which show that the
reform had no eﬀect on the highest level of education, measured using the fraction of individuals
that completed degrees. What we report in Table VIII.4, is that the reform had an eﬀect in
the average duration of education for all inhabitants in those municipalities that oﬀered the
highest forms of education.
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age, or in relation to urban/rural location. When controlling for localization
(using dummy variables indicating the respective counties), we find none of the
other variables are statistically significant. Hence, the reform assignment appears
to be determined exogenously, at least with respect to factors that are testable
with our data.
Although an even development of the reform by city/rural, rich/poor areas
was wanted by the reform committee, and we do not find any pattern, we cannot
completely rule out the allocation being systematic in relation to relevant factors.
For instance, systematic action on behalf of parents (migration to municipalities
with the preferred education system, etc.) cannot be totally ruled out. We have,
however, reason to believe that this is a minor problem and, hence, we ignore it
in this study; see the discussion in Telhaug (1969).
4 The Model
We estimate two models for the returns to education; one in which schooling is
treated as a continuous variable, and one in which we estimate the returns to
diﬀerent levels or types of education. There are several reasons for estimating
returns to years of education. First, most studies of the returns to education
define education in terms of the number of years spent in school. Thus, to
compare our results with previous studies, we define schooling as a continuous
variable. Second, the interpretation of the return to schooling is easier if schooling
is continuous since the number of estimated parameters is reduced.
However, there are strong arguments for treating schooling as discrete. First,
evidence on the returns to education indicates nonlinearities; see Layne-Farrar
et al. (1996) and Bound and Jaeger (1996). A model in which schooling is
treated as a continuous variable implies that returns to schooling are assumed
to be identical for each level of education, which is clearly more restrictive than
a specification allowing for nonlinearities. Second, treating schooling as discrete
allows us to specify a comparative advantage model. In such a model, the eﬀects
of both observed and unobserved factors are diﬀerent for each educational level,
thus allowing for heterogeneity in the returns to education.
In the generalized Roy model (comparative advantage model) we have L po-
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tential outcomes associated with each level of education: y1i, y2i, ..., yLi, where yli
is the outcome for person i if this person takes educational level l. The returns
to education in the Roy model are the outcome (log earnings) given the educa-
tional level l minus the outcome this person would have had with compulsory
education: (yli − y1i). This quantity is never observed directly. However, given
a flexible model that accounts for both observed (Xi) and unobserved (Uli) se-
lection into diﬀerent educational levels, we can predict the outcome for a person
under diﬀerent educational levels. We then average the individual returns over
a given population, such as the total population (for the average treatment ef-
fect) or the subpopulation of persons that obtained educational level l (for the
treatment eﬀect on the treated).
We estimate two models for returns to education: one linear and continuous
in education, and one allowing for nonlinearities and heterogeneity in the returns
to education. The two models are analyzed within quite diﬀerent framework and
the second model is specified as an extended Roy model. For both models, we
consider a model of log annual earnings (y) in 1995 and analyze only full time
employed male workers. Thus, we do not look at females and we do not consider
the selection of persons into full time work, part time work or no work.
4.1 Education as a Continuous Variable
4.1.1 Educational attainment
We allow for heterogeneity in the individual returns to schooling and in the
individual costs of schooling. The optimal level of schooling in the heterogeneity
model is, see for instance Card (1995):
S∗i =
bi − ri
k
, (1)
where bi is individual ability that generates heterogeneity in the marginal returns
to schooling, ri represents individual diﬀerences in opportunities that generate
heterogeneity in the marginal cost of schooling, and k is a nonnegative constant.
The school reforms may aﬀect both bi and ri.
We use an ordered probit model to estimate the eﬀect of control variables and
school reforms on completed school outcomes. The ordered probit model is built
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around a latent regression equation,
S∗i = QiβS + θSZi + Vi, (2)
where S∗i represents the optimal level or type of schooling, Qi is a vector of indi-
vidual and family background variables, βS is the eﬀect of observed background
variables on educational attainment, Zi is the instrument used in this specifica-
tion (mandatory school reform), θS is the eﬀect of the instrument on educational
attainment, and Vi is the error term distributed normally with E(V ) = 0 and
V ar(V ) = 1. We do not observe the latent variable S∗i . However, the observed
optimal choice of education can be modeled in the following way:
Si = l if cl−1 < S∗i < cl,
where l = 1, 2, . . . , L are educational levels and cl are cut-oﬀ levels in the ordered
probit model. We have divided qualification levels into seven discrete categories
as defined in Table I, i.e. L = 7.12 We define c0 = −∞ and cL = +∞; i.e.,
the two extreme categories 1 and L are open-ended intervals. From the ordered
probit model, we can predict the probability of a person attaining the diﬀerent
qualification levels. Thus, we predict Pr(Si = l|Qi, Zi) for all persons in the
sample, and from diﬀerent versions of this equation. In the ordered probit model,
Pr(Si = l|Qi, Zi) is calculated as
Pr(Si = l|Qi, Zi) = Φ(cl −QiβS − ZiθS)− Φ(cl−1 −QiβS − ZiθS), (3)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution.
From the ordered probit model, we calculate the “generalized residual” for
each level of education l. We call the generalized residual ξ and this new vari-
able is used to model unobservables in the earnings equations. The ξs for each
educational level are calculated as follows:
ξli =
φ(cl−1 −QiβS − ZiθS)− φ(cl −QiβS − ZiθS)
Φ(cl −QiβS − ZiθS)− Φ(cl−1 −QiβS − ZiθS)
, (4)
12We also tested a model with 14 diﬀerent educational groups based on the number of years
of schooling. This variable varies from seven years of schooling to 20 years of schooling. A
linear regression model of the number of years of education gives the same results as an ordered
probit model if the cut-oﬀ levels are the same distance apart. Here, we use an ordered probit
model even in the case in which S is treated as continuous in the earnings equations.
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where φ is the probability density function of the normal distribution.
As explanatory variables, Q, in the ordered probit model, with which we
predict educational outcomes, we use age-cohort dummies, dummy variables for
childhood geographical location (19 counties), father’s and mother’s income in
1970 (quartiles), and father’s and mother’s education (whether they have college
degrees or not). Z is the instrument we use (reform of the compulsory school
system). We estimate two versions of the ordered probit model: one in which we
use only the reform of compulsory schooling, and the other in which we interact
all the background variables with the instrument (Q ·Z), to allow the instrument
to aﬀect the level of schooling diﬀerently in terms of family and individual back-
ground variables. Note that in Section 4.2, in which we estimate a comparative
advantage model, Z is a vector of instruments (mandatory school reform plus
interaction between the mandatory school reform and the other school reforms).
4.1.2 Earnings specification
We consider a model of log earnings of the following form:
yi = αi +Xiβ + bSi (5)
where αi is a person-specific constant, b is the eﬀect of schooling, S is the contin-
uous schooling variable, and X is a vector that includes the following variables
in addition to the Q vector in the first step: tenure, tenure squared, actual work
experience, actual work experience squared, and location when adult (19 coun-
ties).
Equation (5) does not take into account the possibility of heterogeneity in the
returns to education.13 However, the model allows individual heterogeneity to
aﬀect the intercept of the earnings equation through αi. A model that incorpo-
rates heterogeneity in the returns to education can be specified by splitting b into
two parts, b = b¯+ bi, where b¯ is the common (average) return to education and bi
is the random return parameter for number of years of schooling, which we allow
to vary from person to person. We split αi into two parts, where αi = a0 + ai.
13However, it is possible to estimate heterogeneity in returns to education on observables
with this model by allowing for interactions between education and observable characteristics.
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We rewrite equation (5) as follows:
yi = a0 +Xiβ + (b¯+ bi)Si + ai, (6)
where bi represents heterogeneity in the returns to education, and ai is hetero-
geneity that aﬀects the level of earnings. Both bi and ai are unobserved variables.
There are two potential sources of bias in equation (6). The first is the
standard ability bias problem, which is due to the correlation between ai and Si.
The second is due to heterogeneity in the returns to education, which is due to
the correlation between bi and Si. We use a control function approach to model
the eﬀect of unobserved factors. We assume
E[ai|Si, Qi, Zi] = λξi
and
E[bi|Si, Qi, Zi] = ψξi,
where λ = Cov(ai, Si)/V ar(Si) and ψ = Cov(bi, Si)/V ar(Si). The variable ξi is
in this case pooled over each educational level since we are analyzing the case in
which S is continuous. Hence, we have the following earnings equation :
E[yi|Xi, Si, ξi] = a0 +Xiβ + b¯Si + ψξˆiSi + λξˆi; (7)
see Card (1999, 2001), and Wooldridge (2003). Applying OLS to equation (7)
yields a consistent estimate of the average eﬀect of schooling on earnings. We
also estimate an instrumental variables (IV) version of this model, which does
not allow for heterogeneity in the returns to education:
E[yi|Xi, Si, ξi] = a0 +Xiβ + b¯Si + λξˆi. (8)
The model in equation (8) is used as a benchmark against which other models
are compared.
4.2 A Model of Comparative Advantage
We now turn to estimation when education is measured as a discrete variable. In
the first stage of the model, that of estimating the school choice model, we use a
sequential probit model. From this model, we estimate an endogeneity correction
term, which is used in the estimation of the Roy model. This correction term is
allowed to work diﬀerently for each educational level.
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4.2.1 Educational attainment
The sequential probit model can be used when the dependent variable (the level
of schooling) can be separated into a sequence of binary choices; see for instance
Heckman and Cameron (1998). This is an alternative to the ordered probit
model used in Section 4.1, and allows for the flexible estimation of educational
attainment. We use the simplest version of the model in which the error term
is independent across sequences, mainly because of identification issues; see for
instance Taber (2000).
In the model of educational choice, we have L levels of education. School
choice is represented by a set of discrete variables: D1i, D2i, · · · ,DLi, where Dli
is the discrete outcome for person i if this person has finished educational level
l − 1. Dli = 1 if a person completes grade l and Dli = 0 otherwise. In the first
choice (education beyond compulsory education, i.e., educational level 2), we let
D2i represent a discrete choice. In the second-choice stage, we let D3i represent
a discrete binary choice only when D2i = 1, etc.
For the first stage, we write D∗1i = QiβS1 + θS1Zi + V1i, where we observe
D1i = 1[D
∗
1i > 0]; hence, Pr(D1i = 1|Qi, Zi) = Φ(QiβS1 + θS1Zi). Estimation is
by standard maximum likelihood on the full sample. For the second stage, we
use Bayes’ formula to formulate
Pr(D1i = 1,D2i = 1|Qi, Zi) = Pr(D1i = 1|Qi, Zi) · Pr(D2i = 1|D1i = 1, Qi, Zi).
We write D∗2i = QiβS2 + θS2Zi + V2i where we observe D2i = 1[D
∗
2i > 0]; hence,
Pr(D2i = 1|Qi, Zi) = Φ(QiβS2 + θS2Zi). Estimation is by standard maximum
likelihood on the selected sample. We continue this strategy up to the last edu-
cational level (DLi). Since we have seven diﬀerent educational levels, to estimate
the model, we assume independence between the error terms in the diﬀerent
specifications.
The vector of instruments, Z, includes the availability of diﬀerent types of
schools at the municipality level. In particular, we use interaction terms between
the reform of compulsory schooling and changes in the availability of other types
of school as identifying exclusion restrictions in addition to the compulsory school
reform. Our specification requires that we have a valid instrument at each level
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of education. Variables and instruments used in the regressions are discussed in
Sections 2 and 3.
4.2.2 The Roy model
The most flexible method of allowing both for nonlinearities in the returns to
education and for heterogeneity in returns, is to specify a Roy model for each
level of education using an identifying instrument for each education level. We
use a switching regression framework, in which earnings regressions are estimated
for each educational level,; see for instance Heckman, Tobias, and Vytlacil (2000).
The advantage of using such a framework is that the returns to education are
allowed to vary both in terms of observed and unobserved individual factors.
This is a demanding framework in the sense that it requires many observations
to avoid the problem of missing cells.
The model has the regression specification
E[yli|Xi, ξli,Dli = 1] = a0 +Xiβl + ψlξˆli (9)
for each educational level l. The results from these diﬀerent regressions can be
used to predict the outcome for educational levels other than the one that is ob-
served for individual i. The return to education is then the outcome of schooling
level l relative to another schooling level, such as schooling level 1, which is com-
pulsory schooling. Thus, the eﬀect of schooling level l is the diﬀerence between
the predicted outcome for person i given schooling level l and the predicted out-
come for the same person had he or she had only compulsory schooling. The
return to schooling is then an average of these diﬀerences. For instance, if we
average over the whole population, we get the average treatment eﬀect (ATE).
If we average over the subsample of persons with the exact schooling level l, we
get the eﬀect of treatment on the treated (TT). The TT parameter given specific
values of X and S is given by
∆TT (S=l,x) = xi(βl − β1) + (ψl − ψ1)ξˆli. (10)
The parameters β and ψ come from the estimation of equation (9) for each ed-
ucational level, and ξ is calculated from a sequence of probit regression models.
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Unconditioned estimates of equation (10), i.e. ∆TT (S=l), can be found by inte-
grating ∆TT (S=l,x) over the distribution of X.
Both the TT and the ATE are relevant policy parameters in our application in
which we are analyzing reforms such as comprehensive school reform. The ATE
parameter gives the eﬀect of selecting at random a person from the population
into a diﬀerent educational level than the one in which that person is observed.
We can thus predict the eﬀect of school reforms that are intended to increase the
level of education in the population as a whole. The eﬀect of the TT parameter is
a relevant policy parameter when calculating the returns to schooling for a group
of individuals with a particular level of education.
Return parameters in the Roy model, such as the one given in equation (10),
have two heterogeneity components. The first is related to observable variables.
In equation (10), the eﬀects of observed individual and family background vari-
ables (xi) are allowed to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent schooling levels. Thus, the
eﬀect of, for instance, family income during childhood is allowed to be diﬀerent
for diﬀerent educational levels. Second, the eﬀect of unobservables (ξi) is also
allowed to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent schooling levels. Thus, the eﬀect of, for in-
stance, unobserved ability can vary between educational levels. We now have a
comparative advantage model in terms of both observed and unobserved factors,
in which individuals are allowed to act on their diﬀerences. This comparative ad-
vantage model (or Roy model) is challenging since we need to estimate earnings
equations for each educational level. The estimation of treatment eﬀects can be
sensitive to imprecise parameter estimates in the earnings equation.
5 Results
5.1 Estimating Educational Attainment
As noted in Section 3.2.1, we wish to establish the eﬀect of reform of compul-
sory schooling on educational attainment. Table X reports the ordered probit
coeﬃcients for the school choice (level of education), in which, as well as adding
the dummy for the old/new regime, we have controlled for a broad range of
demographic and socio-economic covariates, the most interesting being parental
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education and income. Model 1 in Table X is the basic model (which includes
cohort and county dummies whose coeﬃcients are not reported to save space).
In Model 2 in Table X, the reform dummy is interacted with all the variables of
Model 1.14
Table X (Educational choice. Ordered probit model)
In addition to the estimated coeﬃcients, we calculate the eﬀects of changes
in the covariates on the probabilities of the respective education levels, reported
in Table XI.
Table XI (Eﬀects on cell probability choice of changes in covariates)
First, we note from Table X that pupils from the reformed compulsory schools
generally have a significantly higher level of education than those from the nonre-
formed. The magnitude of the eﬀect is illustrated in Table XI. Post-reform pupils
are about 4.5 percent less likely to choose the lowest level of education compared
with the pre-pupil group, and about 3 percent more likely to choose the highest
level.
Parental education appears to be a strong predictor of the educational choice
of the children. If a child’s father has a college education, the probability of
the child leaving school with only compulsory education (Level 1) is reduced by
almost 20 percent, and the probability of attaining a master’s degree (Level 7)
increases by more than 12 percent. Note, however, that this dependence on the
father’s education is lower for the post-reform group than the pre-reform group
(by 3 percent at the bottom and 2 percent at the top). The eﬀect of the mother’s
education shows the same pattern, with the magnitude being slightly smaller, as
is the change from the old to the new system.
Parental income (the sum of the father’s and mother’s income) is included in
the form of quartiles, the lowest quartile being used as a reference. As expected,
14We report the results from the ordered probit model using only one instrument (reform of
compulsory schooling) since we use this specification when estimating the model when schooling
is treated as a continuous variable; see section 4.1. For the model described in Section 4.2, we
use several school reforms and interactions between them in our identification strategy; however,
the results from these regressions are not reported here.
26
higher parental income appears to raise the level of the child’s education. The
eﬀect increases from being quite modest for the second quartile to being quite
large for the fourth. The changes from the old to the new system is less apparent,
but seem to suggest a reduced dependence on parental income for the upper
quartile; see Table XI. The results of Table XI are depicted in Figures II to VII.
Figures II to VII (Marginal eﬀects in the ordered probit model)
The steepness indicates the respective variable’s influence on educational
choice, and the diﬀerence between the solid and dotted lines indicates the ef-
fect of the reform.
5.2 Results from Estimation of the Wage Equation
In this section, we present the results from the estimated wage equations for
the diﬀerent models. We start with the model in which education is treated as
a continuous variable and present results from OLS, IV (selection model) and
random coeﬃcient models. Then we present the results for the model in which
education is treated as a discrete variable representing the type of education.
In this model, we allow for diﬀerences in returns for diﬀerent educational levels.
The model also allows for heterogeneity in terms of observed and unobserved
variables.
5.2.1 Constant returns to years of education
In Table XII, we report the results of the earnings equation in which we assume
constant returns to education by specifying the education variable as a continuous
variable.
Table XII (Earnings equations, full-time employed men, cohorts 1948-1957)
In column 1, we tabulate the OLS returns to education for male workers for
all sectors. Note that we are estimating the wage equation on the birth cohorts
1948-1957, which means that they are 38-47 years of age in 1995. Since prime
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age males are used, returns to education are higher than if we were to use a wider
age range. The returns to education using OLS are 7.5 percent.15
In column 2, results controlling for the endogeneity of education are presented
in which reform of compulsory schooling is used as the identifying instrument.
The model used in column 2 is a standard selection model; see equation (8) in
Section 4.1.2. The results show that returns to education increase to 10.2 per-
cent. This is a standard result from, for instance the literature using a measure
of distance to higher education as an instrument (see Card (1995, 1999)) and for
Norway (see Hægeland et al. (1999)). It indicates heterogeneity in returns to
education in that the instrument we use picks up the returns to education for
the group that complies with the treatment (reform of compulsory schooling). In
this case, it is reasonable to suppose that the compliers, who were being pushed
to higher educational attainment when the new compulsory school system was
introduced, have higher returns to schooling compared with those groups that
were unaﬀected by the reform (for instance, the “always takers” and “never tak-
ers”). The reform may thus have aﬀected both the return and cost parameters
in equation (1), with some feedback to the level of education. The LATE in-
terpretation of returns to education, which is the interpretation of IV estimates
in the case of discrete instrumental variables (see Angrist et al. (1996)) is that
our estimated parameter of returns to education is the returns to education for
a person acquiring an extra year of education just because of the educational re-
form and who would have dropped out of education after seven years otherwise.
15In the model in which education is treated as a continuous variable, we have two versions of
the model. First, we use the actual number of years of education, which ranges from seven to 20
years. Second, we use the level of education, but treat this variables as a continuous variable.
This variable has seven levels (values). We do this to compare our results with the results in
which education is a discrete variable in Section 5.2.2. In Table XII, we report the results for
the model in which we use seven levels of education, rather than the model with the actual
number of years of education. (The results from the regressions that use the actual number
of years of education are available upon request.) The results from this model are comparable
to the one reported here, although the increase in the IV return parameter compared with the
OLS estimates are smaller than the one reported in Table XII. The OLS estimate of the returns
to education for the model not reported here is 5 percent, which is in accordance with results
from other studies in Norway; see Hægeland et al. (1999), Hægeland (2001), Raaum and Aabø
(2000).
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This result contrasts with that from a similar specification in Meghir and Palme
(2003), who find no significant eﬀect on returns to education using participation
in the reform of compulsory schooling as the instrument.
The standard interpretation of the IV results indicates that it is pupils with
poor family backgrounds or pupils with long travel distances to the nearest schools
that are identified when using the school reform as an instrument. This was one
of the groups particularly targeted by the government when it introduced the
reform. The interpretation that credit constraints matter has been challenged
in recent papers; see Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Carneiro et al. (2001).
In these papers, Heckman and his co-authors find support for the notion that,
for the United States, income constraints on families cannot explain the results.
They emphasize long-run factors such as parental guidance and the genes that
form the cognitive and noncognitive abilities of children and which are correlated
with long-run parental income.
For a third specification, we estimate the random coeﬃcient model in which
the interpretation is an average eﬀect since both endogeneity and heterogeneity
are purged from the wage equation. The estimation follows from equation (7)
in Section 4.1.2. The return to education is now 6.3 percent on average per
unit of education, which is slightly lower than in the OLS specification as well
as the selection result reported in column 2 of Table XII. If we interpret this
result literally, it means that the returns to education in the population are
lower when heterogeneity and endogeneity is controlled for. In our case, this
implies that there must have been a slight positive selection into higher education
caused by the reform because the average return to education is lower when this
is controlled for. This result is in line with the LATE result obtained from
the IV estimates presented in column 2, in which the results indicate positive
selection into higher education. We also note that the interaction term between
the selection parameter, ξ, and years of education is negative in this model,
pointing in the same direction.
5.2.2 Returns to education levels
In Table XIII, we first present the regression results from the estimated Roy
model for returns to education by defining education in terms of qualification
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levels from one year of vocational training to master’s degree level; see equation
(9) in Section 4.2.2. The reference level is compulsory education; see also Table
I for definitions of education levels applied in the analysis.
Table XIII (Earnings equations, full time employed men. Roy model)
The table shows that earnings increase with work experience, but at a de-
creasing rate, at all educational levels. The eﬀect of tenure is the same as that of
work experience, but the eﬀect is smaller in magnitude. Note that the eﬀect of
one more year of work experience on earnings is much higher for the two highest
levels of education (university degrees) than is the eﬀect on lower levels of educa-
tion. The eﬀect of family background characteristics on earnings is much smaller
than the eﬀect of these variables on educational attainment. The eﬀect of having
a mother with a college education is about the same as the eﬀect of one more
year of work experience. Note also that the eﬀect on earnings of having a mother
with a college education is larger than the eﬀect of having a father with a college
education. Only 10 percent of the sample had a father with college education,
and only 3 percent had a mother with college education; see Table III. The eﬀect
of family income on earnings is clearly positive as we go from the first income
quartile to the second. This applies for all educational levels. However, the eﬀect
of moving to a higher family income quartile is less clear, and is negative for the
highest educational levels. The eﬀect of the selection correction term of moving
from one educational level to the next is negative for all educational levels. How-
ever, the eﬀect is not significantly diﬀerent from zero for the four highest levels
of education in this specification.
We now turn to the estimation of returns to diﬀerent levels of education; see
Table XIV. The estimation of diﬀerent return parameters is based on equation
(10) in Section 4.2.2. The coeﬃcient estimates from Table XIII are used to form
the βl and ψl coeﬃcients in equation (10).
Table XIV (Returns to education. Eﬀects are measured in percent)
We report the unconditioned mean log earnings and diﬀerences in returns to
education in the first two columns. The unconditioned results show that upper
secondary school generates a 24 percent return for the three years of education.
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Two to three years of vocational training gives a much lower return of about
8.6 percent, and one year of vocational training yields a return of about one
percent. Note that undergraduate regional college or short university degrees
do not give a much higher return compared with that given by upper secondary
school on the basis of the unconditional estimates; in fact, it gives a loss in one
case. This nonlinearity in returns is a striking result and has been noted before;
see Hægeland, Klette and Salvanes (1999).16 The return to a master’s degree is
45 percent relative to that of compulsory school. All these results compare well
with the results of others; for instance, for Sweden see Edin and Holmlund (1997)
and Meghir and Palme (2003).
The next two columns provide the ATE results and the TT eﬀect allowing
for selection on observable and unobservable background characteristics within
the comparative advantage model; see Section 4.2. The results are similar to
the unconditioned results, but there are slight diﬀerences. First, notice that the
returns to upper secondary school are lower when measured as an ATE than
are the unconditional averages in the population. The Roy model predicts an
average eﬀect of a 20 percentage point gain in earnings each year from having an
upper secondary school diploma. Second, adjusting for observed and unobserved
selection, we find that the average eﬀect of higher education is higher than that
implied by the unconditional estimates. Nonlinearities in the average returns to
education remain, but are less apparent than in the unconditional case.
Moving to the results for the TT eﬀect, the final column in Table XIV shows
that these eﬀects provide higher returns at all levels than the ATE and uncon-
ditional eﬀects, except at the vocational level. This means that selection into
higher education is important. The TT eﬀect results indicate strongly that re-
turns to education are high for higher education. Considering the ATE results,
which we can interpret as the result of an experiment of putting the whole pop-
ulation into a particular level of education, the return to education is lower than
16Note that these categories of 1-2 years and especially 3-4 years of college/university degrees
comprise many diﬀerent types of education, as one year of university without a degree via two
years of a college degree to a four-year university degree both in universities (cand.mag. in
the Norwegian system), or a degree from a technical university and a degrees from a business
school, which are diﬃcult to enter on the basis of high school marks. Hægeland (2000) has
analyzed this in detail and the diﬀerence in returns is noticeable.
31
for those students at that education level. This result implies that selection on
comparative advantage is also important because the returns due to selection into
diﬀerent education levels are important. This finding supports earlier findings in
the literature that test for only two levels of education; see Willis and Rosen
(1979) and Garen (1984).
From the final column of Table XIV, we find that the eﬀect of a bachelor’s
degree (level 6) is considerably higher for those actually taking a bachelor’s de-
gree than the eﬀect of randomly selecting a person into that particular level of
education. In addition, the eﬀect of randomly selecting a person into upper sec-
ondary school or a short college programs (one and two year programs), ATE,
gives a surprisingly high eﬀect. Thus, increasing the general level of education,
the intention of the comprehensive school reform in the 1960s and also of other
school reforms, has the potential of giving a high return in wages up to the level
of short college programs, although we do not consider the cost issue for society.
We also find that there is a substantial diﬀerence between the ATE and the TT
for bachelor’s and master’s degrees at universities. Thus, selection eﬀects are
important for university degrees.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have used a rich data set and a flexible framework for esti-
mating the returns to education. We have studied diﬀerent return parameters
of education, both in a linear and nonlinear framework, in which we allow the
eﬀect of education to vary both in terms of observed and unobserved factors.
The model allows agents to act on the eﬀect of schooling and, hence, we have
assumed forward looking agents who can predict the eﬀects of diﬀerent schooling
levels on wage outcomes. Supply side “shocks” are useful instruments in demand
type models and we explored the use of educational reforms as instruments in
identifying and interpreting diﬀerent return parameters of education.
We found that the returns to education are strongly nonlinear and that, be-
cause of nonlinearities, the Roy model is better than the traditional IV model in
which schooling is a continuous variable. In particular, we found that the returns
to upper secondary school and one and two years of education at regional colleges,
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together with master’s programs at universities, have a high return as measured
by wages. Also, we find that the average treatment eﬀect, the eﬀect of randomly
selecting a person, is surprisingly high for medium-length education (up to two
years of college education). This means that increasing the general level of edu-
cation, the intention of the comprehensive school reform in the 1960s and other
school reforms, has the potential of giving a high return in wages, although we
do not consider the issue of the cost to society.
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Table I.  Definition of education levels applied in the analysis. Birth cohorts 1948-57.
Level
1 Pre/post reform compuls. and jun. sec. school (7-10/9 years)
2 Upper secondary school 1 year; mainly vocational
3 Upper secondary school 2-3 years; mainly vocational
4 Upper secondary school 2-3 years; high school
5 University I, post upper secondary school, 1-2 years
6 University II, post upper secondary school, 3-4 years
7 University III, master level, university degree, 5+ years
Table II. Data selection process.
Male born 1948 to 1957, total 295,646
Missing on parents municipality 65,102
Missing on family and individual variables 17,565
Not full time employed or missing tenure 53,527
Net sample 159,452
Table III. Descriptive statistics for the net sample of 159,452 individuals.
Variables Mean Standard deviation
Education in years 12.146 2.7781
Age in 1995 42.729 2.8432
Tenure 7.4685 5.9399
Wage 1995 in NOK 299525 134368
Logwage 12.539 0.3542
Experience in years 21.155 4.0259
Father has college 0.1053 0.3070
Mother has college 0.0326 0.1777
0.8060 0.3953
0.6842 0.4648
0.4231 0.4940
0.2067 0.4049
University I available in municip.
University II available in municip.
Description
Vocational available in municip.
Upper secondary available in munic
Cohort=1948 Cohort=1952 Cohort=1957
13541 16101 17474
0.0598 0.3810 0.9627
Vocational 0.7989 0.7988 0.8153
Upper secondary 0.6538 0.6731 0.7130
University I 0.4027 0.4113 0.4498
University II 0.2141 0.2002 0.2167
1961 1965 1970
0.0210 0.3489 0.9563
Vocational 0.4777 0.4875 0.4889
Upper secondary 0.2472 0.2853 0.3038
University I 0.0833 0.0941 0.1049
University II 0.0111 0.0138 0.0138
Table VI. Observed distribution of qualification levels by reform status. Birth cohorts 1948-57.
Levels Pre-reform Post-reform Change Change in %
1 Pre/post compulsory 0.2057 0.1418 -0.0638 -0.3105
2 Vocational I   0.1674 0.1831  0.0156  0.0934
3 Vocational II  0.2451 0.2821  0.0370  0.1512
4 Upper secondary 0.0446 0.0548  0.0102  0.2286
5 University I   0.1368 0.1433  0.0064  0.0474
6 University II  0.0972 0.0980  0.0007  0.0080
7 University III 0.1029 0.0966 -0.0063 -0.0613
Table VII. Predicted distribution of qualification levels by reform status. Birth cohorts 1948-57.
Levels Pre-reform Post-reform Change Change in %
1 Pre/post compulsory 0.1977 0.1434 -0.0542 -0.2744
2 Vocational I   0.1634 0.1839  0.0204  0.1251
3 Vocational II  0.2459 0.2852  0.0393  0.1599
4 Upper secondary 0.0454 0.0554  0.0100  0.2200
5 University I   0.1387 0.1426  0.0038  0.0279
6 University II  0.0991 0.0958 -0.0033 -0.0332
7 University III 0.1095 0.0934 -0.0160 -0.1469
Number of persons
Compulsory 9 year
Compulsory 9 year
Table IV. Availability of different schools. Individual data.
Table V. Availability of different schools in municipalities. N=435.
0 1
0 11,025 11,602 0,577
Reform
1 11,817 12,348 0,531
0,792 0,746 -0,046
0 1
0 11,104 11,668 0,564
Reform
1 11,876 12,415 0,539
0,772 0,747 -0,025
0 1
0 11,186 11,944 0,758
Reform
1 11,982 12,576 0,594
0,796 0,632 -0,164
0 1
0 11,341 12,114 0,773
Reform
1 12,131 12,66 0,529
0,79 0,546 -0,244
Vocational
University I
Table VIII.2. Means of education by school availability
Table VIII.3. Means of education by school availability
Table VIII.4. Means of education by school availability
Table VIII.1. Means of education by school availability
University II
Upper secondary
Table IX. Implementation of reform. Regression. Cohort 1948-1957.
Coefficient Standard error
County2 -2.0084 0.6361
County3  4.6204 5.1743
County4 -0.5769 0.6302
County5 -0.8327 0.6264
County6 -0.7722 0.6161
County7 -1.2283 0.6241
County8 -1.8233 0.6367
County9 -1.2159 0.6284
County10 -2.2932 0.6748
County11 -0.8081 0.5696
County12 -1.6951 0.5417
County13 -0.5687 0.6689
County14  1.0369 0.5459
County15 -1.5363 0.5518
County16  0.0186 0.5608
County17 -1.2770 0.5311
County18 -0.2418 0.5973
County19 -2.7154 0.6836
Father college  2.4052 3.6445
Mother college  10.732 8.2210
Father income -0.0059 0.0039
Mother income -0.0080 0.0079
Father age  0.0499 0.1510
Mother age -0.0936 0.1872
Size municipality/100 -0.0277 0.0305
Constant term  1970.9 6.6907
Table X. Educational choice. Ordered probit model
Coefficient St.error Coefficient St.error
Father college 0.7349 0.0098 0.7994 0.0144
Mother college 0.5250 0.0162 0.5627 0.0245
Family income 2 0.0996 0.0074 0.0854 0.0101
Family income 3 0.2604 0.0075 0.2520 0.0104
Family income 4 0.5245 0.0083 0.5439 0.0116
Reformed 0.0401 0.0071 0.1879 0.0447
Ref x Father coll -0.1171 0.0196
Ref x Mother coll -0.0594 0.0327
Ref x Fam inc 2  0.0263 0.0149
Ref x Fam inc 3 0.0141 0.0152
Ref x Fam inc 4 -0.0394 0.0167
Cut off level 1 -0.5747 0.0146 -0.5501 0.0176
Cut off level 2 0.0021 0.0145 0.0271 0.0175
Cut off level 3 0.7256 0.0146 0.7508 0.0176
Cut off level 4 0.8705 0.0146 0.8957 0.0176
Cut off level 5 1.3417 0.0148 1.3671 0.0177
Cut off level 6 1.8176 0.0150 1.8433 0.0179
Pseudo R-squared
Observations
Cohorts dummies
County dummies
Note: Standard error in parenthesis. Family income is divided into four equally
sized groups. All the estimated coefficient are significantly different from zero.
Yes Yes
Model 2Model 1
0.0036 0.0037
159,452 159,452
Yes Yes
Table XI. Effects on cell probabilities for educational choice
of changes in covariates
Variable / Level        Pre-reform     Post-reform
Reformed / 1 -.046
Reformed / 2 -.019
Reformed / 3 -.000
Reformed / 4  .003
Reformed / 5  .016
Reformed / 6  .017
Reformed / 7  .029
Father college / 1 -.196 -.167
Father college / 2 -.083 -.071
Father college / 3 -.004 -.003
Father college / 4  .014  .012
Father college / 5  .068  .058
Father college / 6  .076  .065
Father college / 7  .124  .106
Mother college / 1 -.138 -.123
Mother college / 2 -.058 -.052
Mother college / 3 -.002 -.002
Mother college / 4  .010  .009
Mother college / 5  .048  .043
Mother college / 6  .053  .047
Mother college / 7  .087  .078
Fam. income 2 / 1 -.020 -.027
Fam. income 2 / 2 -.008 -.011
Fam. income 2 / 3 -.000 -.000
Fam. income 2 / 4  .001  .002
Fam. income 2 / 5  .007  .009
Fam. income 2 / 6  .008  .010
Fam. income 2 / 7  .013  .017
Fam. income 3 / 1 -.061 -.065
Fam. income 3 / 2 -.026 -.027
Fam. income 3 / 3 -.001 -.001
Fam. income 3 / 4  .004  .004
Fam. income 3 / 5  .021  .022
Fam. income 3 / 6  .024  .025
Fam. income 3 / 7  .039  .041
Fam. income 4 / 1 -.133 -.123
Fam. income 4 / 2 -.056 -.052
Fam. income 4 / 3 -.002 -.002
Fam. income 4 / 4  .009  .009
Fam. income 4 / 5  .046  .043
Fam. income 4 / 6  .051  .048
Fam. income 4 / 7  .084  .078
Table XII. Earnings equations, full time employed men, cohorts 1948-1957.
Coefficient St.error Coefficient St.error Coefficient St.error
Experience  0.0448 (0.0015) 0.0453 (0.0015) 0.0508 (0.0015)
Experience sq / 100 -0.0700 (0.0040) -0.0749 (0.0040) -0.0863 (0.0040)
Tenure 0.0099 (0.0004) 0.0099 (0.0004) 0.0100 (0.0004)
Tenure squared -0.0051 (0.0002) 0.0050 (0.0002) -0.0051 (0.0002)
Father college 0.0347 (0.0030) -0.0008 (0.0042) 0.0548 (0.0046)
Mother college 0.0202 (0.0047) -0.0033 (0.0051) 0.0375 (0.0053)
Family income 2 0.0162 (0.0022) 0.0119 (0.0022) 0.0178 (0.0022)
Family income 3 0.0430 (0.0023) 0.0307 (0.0025) 0.0466 (0.0025)
Family income 4 0.0954 (0.0025) 0.0703 (0.0032) 0.1049 (0.0035)
Education 0.0749 (0.0005) 0.1026 (0.0024) 0.0634 (0.0027)
Lambda 0.0522 (0.0043) 0.0320 (0.0044)
Education*Xi -0.0138 (0.0005)
Constant 11.532 (0.0162) 11.443 (0.0177)  11.462 (0.0177)
R-squared
Observations
Cohorts dummies
County dummies
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Family income is divided into four equally sized groups.
All the estimated coefficient are significantly different from zero.
Table XIII. Earnings equations, full time employed men, cohorts 1948-1957. Roy model.
Level=1 Level=2 Level=3 Levels=4 Level=5 Level=6 Level=7
Experience  .026928  .030970  .055082  .043136  .050999  .080839  .084553
 (0.0040)  (0.0040)  (0.0039)  (0.0096)  (0.0051)  (0.0056)  (0.0057)
Experience sq / 100 -.000440 -.000235 -.001012 -.000877 -.000786 -.001654 -.001561 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Tenure  .011569  .010768  .012012  .017476  .011923  .006854  .016516
 (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0025)  (0.0013)  (0.0019)  (0.0018)
Tenure squared -.004834 -.004446 -.005790 -.009603 -.008124 -.005721 -.011367
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0012)  (0.0007)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)
Father college  .020067  .013230  .013619  .032547 -.005769  .014379  .000442
 (0.0045)  (0.0045)  (0.0042)  (0.0162)  (0.0074)  (0.0095)  (0.0105)
Mother college  .059956  .035636  .040110  .059347  .004724  .015090  .017951
 (0.0049)  (0.0049)  (0.0048)  (0.0220)  (0.0095)  (0.0114)  (0.0122)
Family income 2  .124261  .070130  .081317  .118227  .029707  .082828  .059301
 (0.0063)  (0.0061)  (0.0063)  (0.0330)  (0.0135)  (0.0156)  (0.0168)
Family income 3  .089688  .009227  .020460  .026263 -.015766 -.011849  .025189 
 (0.0114)  (0.0100)  (0.0079)  (0.0252)  (0.0122)  (0.0152)  (0.0160)
Family income 4  .110098  .043323  .026597  .026317 -.019253 -.004452 -.001021
 (0.0258)  (0.0205)  (0.0136)  (0.0276)  (0.0132)  (0.0149)  (0.0111)
Xi  .003115 -.146309 -.067551 -.011152 -.079342 -.028732 -.007680
 (0.0287)  (0.0274)  (0.0260)  (0.0485)  (0.0260)  (0.0260)  (0.0237)
Constant term  11.8939  11.7918  11.6999  11.9881  11.9149  11.6058  11.6845
 (0.0460)  (0.0501)  (0.0474)  (0.1255)  (0.0612)  (0.0669)  (0.0621)
R-squared 0.0831 0.0909 0.0863 0.0923 0.0822 0.1360 0.1097
Observations 27810 27925 41981 7914 22336 15565 15921
Cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predicted log wage 12.343 12.373 12.482 12.681 12.778 12.864 13.191
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Family income is divided into four equally sized groups.
All the estimated coefficient are significantly different from zero.
0.2245
Yes
159,452
0.2238
IV
Yes Yes
159,452
0.2283
Yes Yes Yes
159,452
OLS IV
Table XIV. Returns to education, Roy Model. Effects are measured i percent.
Educational level Descriptive statistics Roy model, Selection
Log earnings Effect ATE TT
Comprehensive 12.397
Vocational I 12.404 0.7 -2.1 0.5
Vocational II 12.483 8.6 8.6 8.3
Upper secondary 12.638 24.1 20.7 22.5
University I 12.676 27.9 28.4 30.6
University II 12.621 22.4 25.4 37.1
University III 12.853 45.6 52.3 64.4
and are not reported here.
Note: Effects are calculated based on E(y|x,S=l) - E(y|x,S=1) both for total
sample (ATE) and for subgroups (TT). Standard errors are bootstrap
using 100 replications. All coefficients are significantly different from zero,
 
Figure I. Accumulated shares of after-reform municipalities and pupils. 
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Figure II. The effect of the reform. 
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Figure III. The effect of father’s education (college or not) before and after the 
reform. 
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Figure IV. The effect of mother’s education (college or not) before and after the 
reform. 
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Figure V. The effect of income (second quartile) before and after the reform. 
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Figure VI. The effect of income (third quartile) before and after the reform. 
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Figure VII. The effect of income (fourth quartile) before and after the reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
